winterspeak.com

What's a repo?

2010-03-17T17:02:00.000-07:00

Marketplace has a nice video on how Repo 105. Unfortunately, they completely miss the role repos play in the banking system. It actually took me a while to figure this out and I understand the banking system very well, so this may be confusing other people as well.

All banks with reserve accounts at the Fed have reserve requirements. These reserve accounts are primarily used for payment settlement, but are also used in a convoluted way to set the Federal Funds Rate. At the close of business, some banks find themselves short their reserve requirements, and other banks find themselves long their reserve requirements, and so those that are short borrow from those that are long via repos. This overnight, interbank lending market uses repos as the vehicle for its overnight interbank loans.

Note that the repo market is not some shady thing, it is how the Fed has decided to enable payment settlement and set the FFR. If all banks closed long reserves, the Fed would intervene in the market until some were short, and force those banks to repo with other banks.

This mechanism means that quality of collateral and counterparty risk enter into a market for payment settlements and the FFR, which is a terrible design. Instead, the Fed's discount window should be the mechanism for payment settlements, and it could set the FFR to zero and be done with it.

James Hamilton is sympathetic to why the Fed should have regulatory authority, despite it's failure to do so.

Insofar as the Fed is expected to fulfill its function as a lender of last resort through the discount window, surely it needs detailed knowledge of the borrower's financial situation. And actionable information on the financial system's health and stability is just as surely essential for knowing when and how fast to change interest rates.

If you understand how the banking system works, however, you would have the Fed lend uncollateralized (thus solving the issue of liquidity risk) and rely on the FDIC to assess capitalization, and hence, solvency. The Fed should not be judging solvency because it is the ultimate liquidity provider to the payment settlement system.

Repo 105 part deux

2010-03-17T08:00:00.000-07:00

Looks like I'm not on the only one struck by how the Lehman Examiner's report elides how the bank was insolvent. And I'm not talking about coming in under regulated capital ratios, I'm talking about a (massively) negative equity number.

Two unanswered questions stand out. The first is that even with the extensive Jenner & Block report, we still do not have even a rough sense of how big the shortfall in Lehman�s equity was at the time of its collapse. We know it was hiding $50 billion of liabilities at the end of its fiscal second quarter through its Repo 105 program, but that only tells us the size of one of the cover-up mechanisms. The Lehman report indicates that William Dudley at the New York Fed thought Lehman might require a $60 billion bailout entity, with Lehman providing $5 billion of equity, which says the authorities pegged the unreported shortfall at $55 billion.

The focus of the report was on how Lehman was shut out of the overnight interbank lending market, and did not go to the discount window. It never explicitly states that the reason it was shut out of the repo market was because it had negative equity, and there was real counter party risk to extending what (by design) should be a riskless loan.

Repo 105

2010-03-16T22:12:00.000-07:00

I scanned a the opening few chapters on Lehman's Repo 105 and I must say, the report, while excellent in its detail, seems to be to conservative on the state of Lehman just prior to its demise. For example:

Lehman maintained approximately $700 billion of assets, and corresponding liabilities, on capital of approximately $25 billion.8 But the assets were predominantly long?term, while the liabilities were largely short?term.9 Lehman funded itself through the short?term repo markets and had to borrow tens or hundreds of billions of dollars in those markets each day from counterparties to be able to open for business.10 Confidence was critical. The moment that repo counterparties were to lose confidence in Lehman and decline to roll over its daily funding, Lehman would be unable to fund itself and continue to operate.

This sets up the problem as one of liquidity, where Lehman's main problem was that other banks lost confidence in it. Certainly, this is the view of Geithner and the Obama administration. But Lehman made a huge number of loans that would not get paid back, loans they kept on their books. I don't know what the capital requirements are for whatever status of bank Lehman Bros was, but Lehman was booking income losses of $3B a quarter, and if it was honest about writing down its CRE and RE assets, it would probably blow through its remaining $22B in capital. So you have an entity with negative equity -- is its main problem that counter-parties will not lend to it?

Lehman did not turn to the Fed discount window, probably because it did not have collateral at the time, and maybe because they wanted to avoid the shame that comes with that. This to me illustrates how poorly the discount window, and interbank loan market, is designed.

A Waste of a Good Crises

2010-03-08T18:19:00.000-08:00

Like the Bourbons, the Main Strem Media -- and many bloggers -- both remember nothing and forget nothing. The New Yorker's John Cassidy demonstrates this in his haigography on Obama's Geithner:

And yet�whisper it softly�there is good news about the financial system and the roundly loathed bank bailout, the seven-hundred-billion-dollar relief package that Congress approved in October, 2008. During the past ten months, U.S. banks have raised more than a hundred and forty billion dollars from investors and increased the reserves they hold to cover unforeseen losses. While many small banks are still in peril, their larger brethren, such as Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and Goldman Sachs, are more strongly capitalized than many of their international competitors, and they have repaid virtually all the money they received from taxpayers.

Huh? Anything given billions of dollars will be billions of dollars richer, but that does not count as "success" or "health". A healthy financial system is one that does not pay itself billions while destroying trillions, a healthy financial system is one which pays itself millions while creating billions. And "success" is achieving such a system. In every way, the financial system of 2010 is worse than the one we had in 2007. It has more moral hazard, more concentration, more political entanglements, more unwritten gaurantees, and even more incentive to loot than before. While Cassidy stands in awe of the geniuses at Goldman Sachs, I will humbly submit that I could make that much money too if the Treasury gave me billions and then promised to underwrite any losses I might incur. So could my cat.

If you want to look at what's put a floor under employment, look at a Government sector that now hires about 25%-30% of all workers, plus a slew of automatic stabalizers, and a fiat (non-gold standard) currency, none of which existed in the 1930s. You will note that Obama's Geithner had nothing to do with any of these. Just as the failure of the financial system seems to be an orphan ("economists are still trying to understand what caused the financial meltdown") the "recovery" has a proud father ("Shhh. The Geithner plan is working").

Simon Johnson points out some of the fallacies in this line of thinking quite well.

Other parts of the econ-blog sphere though grow tired of the wreck that is the financial system and now want to make the money they missed by not buying into the S&P last march. Or, depending on their political leanings, they come up with corkers like this:

...we cannot fix the financial sector without addressing the problems and contradictions [of inequality] which we depend upon financiers to paper over. This never was just a financial crisis. It was, and is, an economic and political crisis, and we are only a very short way down the path towards resolving it.

SRW's a nice guy, but we do not need to build a New Jerusalem before we can focus the financial system on its public purpose: making loans that get paid back. It's a shame to see Steve degrade from a smart thinker about finance to just another cog in the all-consuming kto, kogo industry.

More options if you understand the monetary system

2010-03-05T16:28:00.000-08:00

Rolfe Winkler lays out a good, if often unspoken, reason for why the Obama has supported his predatory financial system instead of fixed it.

Throughout there was much indignation as to why such sensible reforms haven�t been enacted. Wall Street�s lobby machine got most of the blame, the rest went to �the people� for their perceived lack of outrage. But of course people are mad, and though the lobby machine is strong, it�s not the real obstacle to reform.

We are.

We don�t really want it. More to the point, people care more about their jobs than they do about reform.

What the reforms in paragraph 4 all have in common is that they reduce the availability of debt finance. That�s smart because our chief economic problem is that we�ve too much of the stuff.

But said another way, the reforms reduce credit. Like a lot. And that means deep and prolonged recession. Crucially, it means higher unemployment.

The private sector is over levered, and the solution to this is for the Government to pay in additional equity by running higher deficits. If it tries to limit paying in this equity you'll get what we have -- high unemployment and an overleveraged financial system.

SRW once said that the financial system had a MAD strategy, and this is part of that I'm sure. But the Government has the ability to disarm the financial system by levering up, so it can be levered down.

Love this interview

2010-03-01T10:51:00.000-08:00

I love this Harry Markopolos interview.

It's like a car crash, only worse

2010-02-17T22:44:00.000-08:00

A small plane took off in dense fog, crashed into a day care, and took down the power in my neighborhood today. Everyone in the plane died. Thankfully the day care was empty. The lights are back on now.

This post, and the resulting discussion, is a similarly horrible crash, and although no one has died, the lights are still firmly off. Don't waste your time with this, rubbernecking is wrong.

Post Keynesianism in a nutshell

2010-02-14T21:30:00.000-08:00

Here is a recap of the main points of post-keynesianism. I'm going to try and keep it short, so you will not find arguments, justifications, or retorts to standard questions. Just the core tenants as I see them.

1. Federal Deficit Spending Funds Private Savings

In a fiat money system, the State is a currency issuer, while all other parties (including foreign entities) are currency users. Just as in a basketball game, where each team competes hard for points which are meaningless to the score keeper, the State does not need or value money as it can create as much as it chooses at will. To a fiat currency issuing State, money is just points, to be manipulated to maximize real output.

Therefore the State does not need to tax in order to spend. In fact, when the State taxes it destroys money. Similarly, when the State spends, it creates money. When the State spends more than it taxes (runs a deficit) then it is net injecting newly created money into the private sector. When the State runs a surplus, it is draining the private sector of money. The net quantity of money that the State injects into the private sector sloshes around in there as savings, or more accurately, net financial assets. This mechanism is the only way that the private sector can enjoy positive net financial assets, as the liability exists in the Government sector.

I like to think of Federal Debt as "paid in equity" as it is the net financial assets that the State creates and transfers to the private sector for that sector to then leverage on top of.

The purpose of taxes, then, are not to fund Government spending. They are to 1) create demand for the currency in the first place and 2) regulate aggregate demand. If aggregate demand gets too high and creates inflation, the State can raise taxes, run smaller deficits, and drain the private sector of money. The private sector will then have less money available to spend on stuff, and this will tame inflation. In periods of insufficient aggregate demand (like now) the State should lower taxes to fund private sector savings, and reduce deflation.

2. Loans create deposits

Within the private sector, there are entities known as "banks" which are public private partnerships designed to extend prudent credit (make loans that get paid back). Their function has been incredibly perverted in recent years, but nevertheless this is their purpose and it is why they are given access to "reserve accounts" at the Fed.

When a bank makes a loan it does not drawn down a deposit. It simply creates the loan and credit a receivable asset. This then creates credits a deposit liability at some other bank in the system. If these two banks are the same, then nothing further happens -- the loan has created a deposit. If the two banks are different then the bank making the loan debits its reserve account, and the bank receiving the deposit credits its reserve account. The bank short reserves can either try to attract some deposits back, or it can borrow what it needs on the overnight interbank lending market, or, if the system is short reserves as a whole, it can borrow at the discount window directly from the Fed.

The Fed manages the total level of reserves in the system by issuing Treasuries. Treasuries drain reserves, and thus create a situation where some banks are short reserves, and others are long (instead of a situation where every bank has more reserves than it needs). This creates the overnight interbank lending market as firms trade to hit their reserve targets.

Note that banks are not reserve constrained in their lending in any way. Bank lending is constrained by capital requirements on the supply side, and creditworthy customers on the demand side. In essence, banks have license to "print money" and do so by expanding both sides of their balance sheet at the same time when making a loan. Private capital is in first loss position to encourage banks to only make loans that should be paid back, but a host of innovations (such as securitization) has dramatically undermined the banking sectors ability or interest in assessing credit accurately.

All bank spending, in fact, is done through balance sheet expansion, as they print money to pay salaries, buy printers, and eat lunch. I know, this is crazy, but it's true. Conversely, when loans get paid back (or are written down), money is destroyed and balance sheets contract.

Also note that Treasuries are simply a mechanism to drain excess reserves, and thus create an interbank overnight lending market, and thus set the Federal Funds rate. Treasuries are not the US Govt "borrowing" money and they could stop doing so at any time to no ill effect. In today's ZIRP environment, there wouldn't be any discernible effect at all, actually.

Lay off the Chinese

China buys a lot of US Treasuries, but China is not "funding" the US in any way. Rather, the US is funding China's desire to save US$. China makes real stuff, and gives that to the US in exchange for $. These $ live in a reserve account. When the US issues Treasuries, some of these $ move from reserve accounts to Treasury accounts. When they mature they will move back to reserve accounts. It is no big deal.

I think that's about it. All of the above is based on accounting and operational reality. It is not a "theory" -- merely a description of how things work in actuality. It decimates all of Macroeconomics and the Federal Governments policy towards debt, finance, the financial industry, and unemployment.

Excellent thread

2010-02-13T08:33:00.001-08:00

The post is nonsense, but the comments are very good.

Why the PIGS might end the EMU

2010-02-05T16:04:00.000-08:00

I've meant to talk further about the link between savings and investment brought up in the previous post, but have not had time.

Next week will be interesting as we see what happens with the PIGS, and the European Monetary Union. PIGS stand for Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain, for Euro countries with weak economies, high unemployment, and large public deficits. European Monetary Union means that these countries cannot issue currency the way the US, or Switzerland can, and operate with real budget constraints, much like US States. But US States can at least hope for Federal largess -- there is no Federal currency issuer in the EU who can write a cheque to the PIGS and bail them out. So they have to choose between debt deflation, and Great Depression level unemployment, or exiting the EMU, reclaiming national sovereignty, and if their obligations are euro denominated, defaulting.

Interest rates have gone parabolic today, as the logic of Diamond-Dybvig pushes those countries toward their only, stable equilibrium.

You'll see columnists talk about how the EMU would be fine if there was more labor mobility etc. This is nonsense. What they need is a super-currency issuer who knows what they are doing. You will also see columnists talk about how the PIGS debt default (if it comes to that) also foreshadows risks in countries like the US and the UK. This is also nonsense, because those countries retain a sovereign currency and thus need never default.

Long thread at interfluidity

2010-01-31T14:37:00.000-08:00

Steve and I go back and forth on this long thread at interfluidity. JKH makes a couple of appearances, injecting sanity into the discussion, so it's worth reading for that alone.

I think Steve understands how loans create deposits, but he does not understand how savings is how you account for real investment. I'm bad at explaining loans->deposits, and I'm even worse at explaining investment->savings.

Here is a very good explanation of how savings and investment are connected (thanks Scott!)

The Fed cannot inflate. Buy Bonds.

2010-01-27T11:06:00.000-08:00

Ben Bernanke is famous for saying that the Fed can always inflate if needs be by "dropping money from helicopters".

But the Fed cannot "drop money from helicopters". Only the Treasury can. Helicopter drops of money are fiscal policy, not monetary policy, as they create net new financial assets for the non-Govt sector. The Fed cannot inflate.

If you think about the mechanisms the Fed has, it becomes clear that they do not have to tools to create inflation. They can control interest rates, but rates are a double edged sword as the non-Govt sector has both borrowers and lenders. Low rates help borrowers but hurt savers, and high rates do the opposite. At a sector level, the impact of interest rates is muddled at best, there certainly is no clear mechanism to generate inflation.

The Fed can also alter the level of bank reserves. If banks lent out reserves, this might have some impact on private sector credit expansion, but as banks do not lend out reserves, it does not. There's been a long debate in various blogs about whether, on the margin, a vast sea of reserves might have some impact on bank behavior, but nothing definitive came out of it. As a mechanism, it's weak.

The only thing left is belief, something that Nick Rowe came very close to admitting in a post a few months back. "Monetary policy does not actually work, but if people believe it works, it might". There you have it, Fed as Placebo. I think much of the runup in the S&P has been based on two things: 1) cheap labor (which helps corporate profits) and 2) a belief that the Fed will get the economy restarted. If 2 weakens, then all that's left is unemployment to enrich corporations by helping their bottom line, but there is no demand to help them grow their top line. It's a very ugly scenario, and one that Japan's been enjoying for about 20 years now.

The Obama administration's recent moves to cap deficits means that the hawks have taken control of that, and the Government will stop creating the net financial assets that the private sector so desperately wants. This will put a ceiling on aggregate demand, Another equity downleg and it may be all over.

I blame Robert Rubin. I met him many years ago at U Chicago, and he was intelligent, articulate, and completely different from then Treasury Secretary Snow who begged us to ask him about his Africa trip with Bono because he didn't understand any of the derivative regulation questions we were peppering him with. The Clinton gang, in particular Rubin, believe that the Clinton surpluses were what generated the boom the US enjoyed in the 90s. That is the driver for Obama to get tough on the deficit. In reality, of course, the Clinton surpluses dramatically increased the fragility of the private sector by draining it of savings, leaving it more levered BEFORE the Greenspan orchestrated real estate bubble. The dot com asset bubble, and various other lukcy drivers of aggregate demand papered over this increasing fragility, but sector level balance sheets don't lie. At any rate, Rubin learned the wrong lessons from that episode, and Obama is setting the economy up for a 2010 that will either be bad or worse.

Even at 3% (or whatever) I recommend you buy Treasuries.

Mankiw becomes drunk on power

2010-01-25T21:22:00.000-08:00

Mankiw is a cheap date. He doesn't even need real power, just the smell of it is enough. Look at this opening:"One of my many friends working for President Obama sends me this email, along with permission to share it with my blog readers". OMG. One of his many friends, who work for President Obama, who not only leak, but give him permission to share it with his blog readers. Heady stuff, to be sure. And what is the great inside scoop?

The most vivid case in point is the recent policy announcements about implementing the Volcker ideas about separating investment and commercial banking.

This policy process has been in the works for months, and it came to fruition in the normal course of policy operations after extensive meetings and consultations among Treasury, NEC, the PERAB board, and other parties.

So, the Volcker plan is not because the Dems just lost Massachusetts and healthcare, it's been in the works now for months, and the timing was coincidence.

Greg, who seems to be anybody's after smelling the glass of wine concurs: "Thanks for helping to get the true story out." Others are less credulous. They may believe that the Volcker plan was exactly what it seems like, a panicked response to an unexpected, and terrible, electoral loss after a whole raft of unpopular policies have failed to make a dent in unemployment. And the leak is an attempt to get friendly bloggers to pass along the official party line. Thoughts like this are the basis of conspiracy theories.

Sanity and Insanity at Macro Man

2010-01-22T20:27:00.000-08:00

An excellent comment thread at Macro Man. The context: Macro is complaining because the Volcker plan will limit what banks can do, and try to separate out prop trading from taxpayer backstopped institutions.

And while it is probably imprudent to comment too much until the details are known, on the face of it [the Volcker plan's] draconian approach is both woefully misguided and appallingly naive. We can probably all agree that it's in no one's best interests to have a situation where a Lehman Brothers owns $50 billion+ in residential and commercial real estate turds, which brings down the firm and threatens the global financial system.

But there's a big difference between that and having a team of punters (not dissimilar to your author) who coordinate and utilize the market intelligence available to large banks (which is enormous and extremely valuable) to make informed bets in the marketplace.

In the comments, Gary smacks Macro down:

My junior guy, like myself, was unwilling to try to hedge the subordinate tranches from all the deals the securitization group was making. Obviously, securitizing toxic waste was a huge money maker as long as you pretended the risk wasn't there.

Every bank bought the toxic waste, put it in a REMIC/CDO/ABS whatever and sold off the senior tranches. The subordinate tranches stayed on the banks books and were hedged.

When the volume of deals got high enough, the true cost of hedging increased. Experienced traders of course wanted to pass that cost back to the securitization desk -- which would have made many deals less profitable if not unprofitable.

The solution was two fold -- "promote" the senior traders to some other department, get rid of the trained staff, and bring in yes men straight out of college. The newbies wouldn't realize the risk, much less the cost of that risk. They would be happy to book the accounting profits; that they were massively short gamma didn't bother them in the least.

Essentially, these guys were making money by being short straddles in size -- often 20-25 times the banks capital. As soon as there was any volatility, the banks were finished.

Later, the garbage was put into SIVs to conceal the risk (and its size) from the banks' balance sheets. To add fuel to the fire, the short straddles were "financed" with overnight money that would be pulled if (when) the risk became known.

Experienced traders knew this and didn't want their deferred compensation to get hit (deferred comp used to be common in many firms). So management replaced them with crony newbies were happy to go along.

The "banking" crisis occurred in 2003-2004 when these short straddle positions became many times larger than the banks themselves. It wasn't until 2007 when the accounting caught up to the risk

My former junior guy is doing quite well now at a hedge fund. The newbie the bank managers put in is now selling sunglasses in Florida. And the bank is now one of the many zombie banks being propped up at taxpayer expense

BTW Macro Man -- I have no idea how many bank CEOs tried to conceal their problems versus how many simply didn't understand the risk was on their books. I suspect (but could not prove) some of both.

Regardless, if you understand the culture / politics of big banks, then you know the department that is generating massive profits often runs the place. If the CEO "stands up to them", they mutiny and the CEOs job is in jeopardy -- either the group leaves and the firm's profits drop, or the group goes to the board of directors to get the CEO fired.

And there is no way to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the securitization group really understood the risks -- they just knew one trader was willing and another was not. It sounds bad in 20/20 hindsight, but you can't prove anything beyond a reasonable doubt (i.e. in a court of law).

Even knowing my ex-CEO for years, I couldn't say for sure what he was thinking.

The corporate culture of big banks is why they should not be allowed to prop trade -- the culture prevents good risk management.

Private partnerships err on the side of being a little too cautious -- its their own money they are risking on something they don't understand.

Deferred comp systems only work if management doesn't have lucrative severance packages and if the comp is deferred many years (until the assets mature).

Big banks risk / accounting is decided by committee -- so its quality is completely politics. Ultimately, you have to decide whether to pick a fight and lose YOUR job; or do you keep quiet and let the suckers (aka shareholders) take the hit. Its a classic agency problem

The heart of banking is making loans that get paid back. Every element in their structure and regulatory environment should sharpen this goal, not dull it.

Scott Brown vs Timothy Geithner

2010-01-21T20:48:00.000-08:00

Paul Volker has been passing his cup along for a long time now, and has been used for nothing more than window dressing in the Obama Administration. Volker isn't a PhD, and is thus free from a lot of nonsense that's being taught in Economics departments, but he isn't an accountant by training nor has he ever had an operational role in a bank. So he isn't good, he just isn't appallingly bad.

Volker's skills, though, are not what catapulted him from the periphery of the Obama administration to its political center. It was Scott Brown's win in Massachusetts, and the end of Obama's health care hopes.

Timothy Geither and Larry Summers, by transferring money from taxpayers to the banks, and telling Obama that "once that banks are healthy the economy will follow" have killed healthcare. Banks are pro-cyclical, and Geither and Summers' advice was wrong. Employment is at 10%, and banks are making record profits. Obama has lost Massachusetts, he's lost healthcare, and the midterm results are just going to make things worse. I wonder if he's mad at Geithner, Bernanke, and Summers.

The Volker proposal is a step in the right direction. It isn't nearly far enough, but he labors under the same "gold standard" fallacy that infests the profession, but is thankfully free of "banks should be unregulated" nonsense pushed by Greenspan. I don't think that this proposal will go very far either, though.

Taxing Wall Street Down to Size

2010-01-20T09:44:00.000-08:00

I do not agree with the prescription in this NYTimes Op Ed, but I agree with much in the description.

WHILE supply-side catechism insists that lower taxes are a growth tonic, the theory also argues that if you want less of something, tax it more. The economy desperately needs less of our bloated, unproductive and increasingly parasitic banking system. In this respect, the White House appears to have gone over to the supply side with its proposed tax on big banks, as it scores populist points against the banksters, too.

At a structural level, the economy needs a financial sector that adds value, and that is certainly a smaller one. But it also needs more net private savings, which a bank tax (or any tax) will not do.

Make no mistake. The banking system has become an agent of destruction for the gross domestic product and of impoverishment for the middle class. To be sure, it was lured into these unsavory missions by a truly insane monetary policy under which, most recently, the Federal Reserve purchased $1.5 trillion of longer-dated Treasury bonds and housing agency securities in less than a year. It was an unprecedented exercise in market-rigging with printing-press money, and it gave a sharp boost to the price of bonds and other securities held by banks, permitting them to book huge revenues from trading and bookkeeping gains.

A bigger problem than low interest rates was poor capital controls. Capital controls are what limit lending, not reserves, and capital controls have absolutely stunk for a while now at every level. The situation is worse now as private capital is no longer in a first loss position.

In supplying the banks with free deposit money (effectively, zero-interest loans), the savers of America are taking a $250 billion annual haircut in lost interest income. And the banks, after reaping this ill-deserved windfall, are pleased to pronounce themselves solvent, ignoring the bad loans still on their books.

This is an excellent point that is totally lost on the monetary fanatics who walk the halls of the Academy -- low interest rates rob the private sector of interest income, and thus have a deflationary impact as well as their supposed inflationary impact. The harder one looks for an inflationary mechanism though, the harder it is to find. Low interest rates may, net, hurt the economy.

To argue, as some conservatives surely will, that a policy-directed shrinking of big banking is an inappropriate interference in the marketplace is to miss a crucial point: the big Wall Street banks are wards of the state, not private enterprises.

This is another, excellent point, but if anything too narrow. Banks in general are public private enterprises, with their access to reserve accounts giving them money printing ability that other parts of the private sector do not have. The Federal Reserve is technically a private organization too, but that's obviously nonsense -- it is part of the Government. Banks and GSEs have more in common than they realize.

To be sure, the most direct way to cure the banking system�s ills would be to return to a rational monetary policy based on sensible interest rates, an end to frantic monetization of federal debt and a stable exchange value for the dollar.

Monetary policy has almost no impact on the economy. The most direct way to cure the financial system's ills would be to fund the demand for private sector savings via a payroll tax holiday. Banks should be restructured to an extent that makes Glass Steagal look like Barak Obama's financial "reform" act.

Weekend links

2010-01-16T07:15:00.000-08:00

Billy Blog has the post-Keynesians take on the Austrians here. The whole thing is a little inside baseball, so only read it if you care. The irony is, of course, that when Keynes displaced the Austrians, their description of economic reality was actually closer to the truth, as Austrianism understands gold standard economies pretty well, and the General Theory is a muddle. When Keynes was overtaken by the Monetarists, you essentially had the Austrians re-establish themselves, but under an even more confused and muddled barrage of mathematics, in a fiat monetary system that complies pretty well with the General Theory!

Finally, a word on Obama's bank tax.

Like Megan, I do not support it, although my reasoning is different. The private sector is not done deleveraging, and any action that drains private sector savings, be it quantitative easing or a bank tax, is bad as it will undermine aggregate demand when that is still very weak. If you hear the phrase "it will be good for taxpayers" then it will almost certainly be bad for taxpayers as the US needs higher deficits still right now, not lower ones.

Also, banks are still undercapitalized, especially if they recognize the market value of their assets. The Fed has waived capital requirements so this does not impact them operationally, but those requirements, I assume, will come back some day and an adequately capitalized banking sector is something that the economy needs. Banks are de-capitalizing themselves through absurdly large salaries and bonuses, which is bad, but taxing them has the same effect. The UK approach -- taxing the bonuses themselves -- is better in this regard.

As a tax payer, I don't want to get my bailout money back. I want to see that we got something for the money, namely a sanely managed financial system. I'm not seeing that yet.

Updates to weekend reading

2010-01-09T10:35:00.001-08:00

Warren Mosler has more on the decline in private sector credit.

Also, Scott Fullwiler has an excellent post on why Ben Bernanke's "helicopter drop" is fiscal not monetary.

A comment on this last point. The last refuge of scoundrel economists, who argue that monetary policy is all you need, is the assertion that a helicopter drop is somehow "monetary" too when it is clearly fiscal. if you redefine monetary to mean fiscal, then yes, monetary is all you need, but let's be honest about what's actually happening. It's fiscal. Here's a clip from some email correspondence I had illustrating this exact subterfuge:

Academic economist: At least to me, it's clear that your example [helicopter drop] is two operations.
1) Adding 1M to bank reserves gratis is fiscal policy. Effectively it was a $1M transfer. (We've added to government liabilities without adding anything to its assets, so that's fiscal policy via my definition.)
2) Because an addition to bank reserves has increased the money supply, it's also monetary policy.

winterspeak: By this definition, all fiscal policy is monetary policy. Whenever the Treasury spends, it changes the money supply, Whenever the Treasury taxes, it changes the money supply.

Can you please define monetary policy in a way that is not fiscal policy.

There you go. If you believe that bank reserves do a damn thing, which in a normal environment they do barely as they influence the FFR, and in this environment they really don't because the Fed is paying interest on reserves, then anything that impacts reserves is monetary policy. And since deficit spending can impact reserves, all fiscal becomes monetary.

Weekend links

2010-01-08T20:50:00.001-08:00

Kevin Murphy was the smartest person I met at Chicago. Becker ran a close second. It's sad to see them write editorials like this one in the WSJ:

In terms of discouraging a rapid recovery, other government proposals created greater uncertainty and risk for businesses and investors. These include plans to increase greatly marginal tax rates for higher incomes. In addition, discussions at the Copenhagen conference and by the president to impose high taxes on carbon dioxide emissions must surely discourage investments in refineries, power plants, factories and other businesses that are big emitters of greenhouse gases.

The stuff on reserves and the banking system is standard academic macroeconomics, and therefore completely wrong. I cannot think when "the market hates uncertainty" sounded more tone deaf.

A number of articles pointed to the ongoing de-leveraging within the private sector. This is the key story of the economy, with the only question being whether the Govt funds this de-leveraging by actively running deficits, or instead uses unemployment as a policy tool and does nothing, letting automatic stabilizers fund private demand for savings.

Consumer Credit outstanding fell a greater than expected $17.5b m/o/m in Nov vs an estimated drop of $5b and follows a revised $4.2b decline in Oct. It is the 13th month of the last 14 that has seen a reduction and is the biggest monthly drop ever. The decline was led by a sharp 18.5% annualized drop in revolving credit which consists mostly of credit cards. Nonrevolving credit outstanding fell 2.9% annualized and is made up mostly of auto loans. Total consumer credit outstanding now stands at $2.464T, the lowest since July �07 and has fallen $117b from the record high in July �08. To put the last decade of credit growth into perspective, nominal personal consumption rose 55% (same increase as overall GDP) while consumer credit rose 61% over the same period. Thus, highlighting how dependent on credit the US became rather than on savings in generating growth.

People want to save more. Will the Govt help or hinder?

Why you should walk away from your mortgage

2010-01-06T22:20:00.000-08:00

Megan McArdle argues that underwater homeowners should continue to pay their mortgages, and not "ruthlessly default" by walking away if they can continue making their mortgage payments. She argues that the social norm to honor debt are important to a well functioning society, and if this norm was eroded we would all pay through higher interest rates etc.

I disagree. In the context of the credit bubble, banks made loans to customers who could not service that debt out of income. It was a two way bet on rising asset prices. Since that bet did not work out, the borrower should walk away, and the bank should write the asset down. If the loan had been made on the basis of income, then I would agree with Megan.

Waldmann, and I think Salmon, view the tightening of credit as a feature rather than a bug, of course--they'd like to return to the days of paternalistic credit markets

Waldmann and Salmon want to return to the days where banks made loans that would be paid back. This is not paternalism, this is Sanity.

Amazingly, Megan has managed to write a post on the credit bubble without realizing there was a credit bubble at all.

Richard Koo, who is so close, is still wrong

2010-01-02T20:30:00.000-08:00

In an earlier post I highlighted why predicting what will happen in the future is so difficult. Geither, Obama, and Summers have no idea how the monetary system works and therefore are unpredictable in whether they will act to improve the situation or make it worse. Richard Koo, who understands the situation in Japan (which is very very similar) quite well still makes suboptimal recommendations because he too does not understand how the financial system works. Here's him in an article in Barron's:

I'm explaining to the Americans that the disease you've got, is the disease we got 15 years earlier. Most Americans are flabbergasted by the fact that the Federal Reserve has lowered interest rates to zero, flooded the market with liquidity -- and the economy is still going absolutely nowhere. Unemployment is still increasing, people are still retrenching, deleveraging. When the central bank brings rates down to zero, a lot of things are supposed to happen, but there's nothing happening. But that's what we experienced in Japan. The Bank of Japan brought the rates down to zero, did massive quantitative easing, with no result whatsoever. This happens because of a balance-sheet recession.

This is exactly correct. The private sector in the US has taken on more debt than it can/wants to support out of income. Therefore, it is de-leveraging, paying down debt and saving, which is driving aggregate demand lower. Only fiscal action through higher deficits can support aggregate demand while this happens. So, Koo gets that right, but then there is this:

In an ordinary, garden-variety recession, as we learned in school, the private sector uses money more efficiently, and a budget deficit is considered bad. But when the private sector is completely absent and paying down debt at zero interest rates, and the government doesn't borrow this money, what happens? Even a child would understand the whole thing could collapse. The only way the government can turn this economy around is to do the opposite of the private sector -- borrow the money the private sector saved and spend it, which means fiscal stimulus. That's what saved Japan from entering a Great Depression.

He's correct in saying that massive fiscal stimulus saved Japan. They really were on the brink of their Great Depression in the 80s, and have avoided it without going to War. This is good, but none of it was necessary, so really represents a massive failure.

Koo thinks that the Govt is spending the money the private sector has saved. In fact, Govt spending is what is giving the private sector its savings! Government is not borrowing anything. Japan should really just massively slash taxes and fund its private sector. Let the balance sheets heal already!

Koo does not talk about all the terrible malinvestment that the Governments fiscal spending did. The US should simply implement a payroll tax holiday until inflation starts to tick up.

Right now, the US's savings desire is not as high as the Japanese's, but a double dip might get it closer. That just means the US will need even higher deficits. It took Japan 20 years to start getting comfortable with sufficiently large deficits. Now might be a good time to go long the Nikkei, actually.

Happy New Year

2009-12-31T16:01:00.000-08:00

Let's look back at the past decade. Two things stand in stark contrast.

First, the world is blessed with incredibly talented creators. The iPod, iPhone, Google, Prius, DSLR, Harry Potter, Matrix 1 etc. are remarkable achievements and will impact us for many years. Maybe generations. It is great to be alive now and enjoy this wonders.

Second, the world is cursed with appallingly bad Governance. We have a banking system that is supposed to make loans that get paid back. It fails. We have a Govt whose job it is to fund savings and maintain employment. It fails. We have a regulatory system that is supposed to focus banking on its proper purpose. It fails. We have an academy that is supposed to understand how the financial system works and explain it to others. It fails. Managing a fiat monetary system correctly is one of the top 3 responsibilities of a Government, and the US has demonstrated incredibly incompetence in this regard. Bernanke, Obama, Geithner, Summers, Rubin, Greenspan, are all culpable.

Moreover, just as the financial crises has exposed Macroeconomics to be a heap of rubbish with equations, what about Climategate? It has vanished down the memory hole, as if it never happened. The problems at the Academy, and the Academy/Agency nexus are just not getting fixed. The situation is unfixable.

Here's a graph of the Nikkei from 1984 to 1994.

It should scare be bejeesus out of you. I could make it scarier by extending the graph another 10 years up to 2004. The situation is parallel: the private sector built up debt levels above their ability to service out of income, and suffered a credit collapse. 20 years later, the Government has still refused to fund the private sectors demand for net savings by running insufficiently high deficits, and the economy has operated at a fraction of its available capacity. Worse still, the economic activity produced by the Japanese has been misdirected to harmful ends and the island is covered by ugly concrete.

Those who got out of the market in 2009 and are wondering whether 2010 is the year to jump back in, look at Japan. The jump from 15K to 20K in 1993 was a 50% rise -- fully equivalent to the bump the US had in 2009. But it all went away and it's been zigzagging between those bounds ever since. For 20 years and counting.

The last 10 years have been low return, high volatility for stocks. The next ten years will be the same, unless we see some mechanism that supports the de-leveraging sought by the private sector.

Engineering and the Muslim World

2009-12-30T11:24:00.001-08:00

For a publication that prides itself on celebrating diversity and understanding other cultures, this article on why terrorists have engineering degrees is remarkably parochial. In the Muslim World, if you have some wealth, your son becomes a doctor if he is smart, an engineer if he is average, and an accountant if he's dumb. Daughters have their own menu of possibilities.

College, and college degrees, have a very different position and meaning in society there than they do in the US.

Two threads -- what I learned

2009-12-24T21:57:00.000-08:00

I strongly recommend the thread on Unqualified Reservations (not the post). Some key things I learned:

1. Even people in banking do not seem to understand how banking works. The Academy, and therefore the Fed, are most clueless though.
2. Post-Keynesians tend to focus on how loans create reserves, that then get cycled into deposits via the overnight interbank lending market. In practice, banks run a day-to-day Treasury function that tries to fund assets with liabilities other than borrowed bank reserves overnight. The degree to which banks utilize the overnight interbank market varies by bank and bank business model, but generally, they try to get deposits and other liabilities instead.

This makes sense since bank profit is generated by the spread, and the lower your cost of capital, the higher your profit margins (as lending is capital constrained).

Two threads

2009-12-23T14:14:00.000-08:00

It's worth looking at two threads.

First, the charming Nick Rowe takes his theories at their face and notices they do not accord with reality. His conclusion?

Either somebody up there likes us. Or there's something wrong with macroeconomic theory.

The post itself is banal, but there are good details in the comments from JKH about how post-Keynesian economics deviates from actual bank operation.

Where zanon is wrong is in his assumption that the required offsetting reserve inflow must be attracted directly from another bank. (btw, this is a common error made by PK readers.) In fact it normally isn't. The normal operation is to attract non-bank deposits where the source of the money coming in is drawn from non-bank accounts with other banks. The reserve inflow is attracted indirectly rather than directly.

Worth reading.

Another slice of reality enters in a thread over at Mencius Moldbug. It's the usual stuff about the evils of maturity transformation, perhaps true, but irrelevant to fiat monetary systems and therefore, reality today. Still, zanon (in comments) takes on Michael S, who works at a bank but perhaps has never thought about banking in a macro sense. We'll see how the conversation develops. Again, skip the post, but read the comments.