Politics of PK

Business Insider believes that Goldman embraces PK in their analysis. I don't see it.

In a study presented at the Brookings Panel on Economic Activity on March 22-23 in Washington D.C., Bradford DeLong and Lawrence Summers examine the effectiveness of fiscal policy in a depressed economy. Specifically, they use a simple model to explore the effects of fiscal stimulus in an environment when (1) monetary policy is constrained by the zero bound on nominal interest rates; and (2) a boost to output today brings longer-run benefits for the productive capacity of the economy (for example, by avoiding "scars" or "hysteresis" in the labor market). They call such an environment a "depressed" economy.

They reach two conclusions. First, while the fiscal multiplier is low, perhaps as low as zero, in a normal situation, fiscal stimulus today would be highly effective in affecting output both now and in the future. Second, temporary fiscal stimulus could be self-financing (and may well reduce long-run debt-financing burdens) when one takes into account the effects of present stimulus on the evolution of future output and debt-to-GDP ratios.

The DeLong and Summers paper, unsurprising for two Democrats, only talks about higher Government spending (G), not higher deficits (G-T).

The "higher G" argument to "prime the pump" is K, not PK.

It's also fun to see how careful the authors are to remain on the good side of Monetarists, who continue to set the orthodoxy for macro. Does any of this sound like PK to you?

In normal times the logic of Taylor (2000) that stabilization policy should be left to the monetary authority still holds.

The fear is that expansionary fiscal policy will lead to a collapse in confidence in the government, and a spiking of interest and inflation rates to previously-unseen values.

Sovereign debt crises can be triggered by rises in spending due to expansion

All basic gold-standard stuff.

The Case for Austerity

I support larger stimulus and greater deficits. This is because the private sector is still overleveraged, and wants to increase its net financial assets. The deleveraging process is reducing aggregate demand, and getting to a debt level that the sector can service out of income via default will bring with it massively higher unemployment, and thus real output losses. Our current 10% unemployment rate is already too high, and the real output losses acute. So, let's stimulate through higher deficits.

Let me now try to make a case for Austerity.

The credit crises exposed distribution that seems unfair to the electorate. Or at least grossly inefficient. For example, the financial sector is remunerated multiple times above the non-financial private sector, and yet, once you factor in the cost of bailouts, seems to net destroy wealth. This seems unfair, or at least, grossly inefficient. Much of the Obama administration's stimulus has benefited the financial sector directly, supporting and extending this practise.

Public sector unions such as the SEIU and the teachers union, especially in California, have lavish benefits and retirement packages that they can juke to increase to obscene levels. At the same time, they enjoy extreme job security in a system that does not seem to reward competence or productivity. In California, young promising teachers are fired while teachers on probation (and therefore, not teaching) get paid full salaries for years. Again, this seems unjust, or at least, grossly inefficient.

And Greece has a large public sector, which draws the best and the brightest for its generous compensation and job security, while the Germans work hard, save, and export all the fruits of their labor so they can save some more. The Germans tighten their belts, while the Greeks strike so they can keep retiring at 60. This may seem unjust, or at least grossly inefficient, to the Germans.

And, at ground zero, irresponsible homeowners took on massive loans they could not afford, which inflated the price of housing leaving the prudent "priced out forever". An ocean of tax breaks, bailouts, hand outs, ZIRP, etc. have all focused on helping the irresponsible homeowner, keeping house prices high, and the prudent stuck on the sidelines.

All of these situations are political, and as Rahm noted, you need a great crises to tackle them. So far, stimulus has taken the form of extending and further entrenching the inefficiency and malinvestment. All of this has real cost, in badly allocated resources, lost opportunity, and a further corrosion of the polity (such as it is). If this be "stimulus", the Austerians might say, then maybe it is time to "purge the rot from the system".

If stimulus took the form of flat rate, per capita transfers, then we could purge the rot while protecting employment. But unfortunately, academic macroeconomics does not understand that Government deficits fund net private savings, and so it managed aggregate demand for savings through unemployment and not through appropriate fiscal policy.

Accounting for Loans, deposits, and equity

winterspeak reader TH asks:

There's just one part of introductory MMT that I can't quite figure out: why, if loans create deposits, can a banking system have a loans-to-deposits ratio other than 1? Do some loans somehow not
create deposits in equivalent amounts?

Bank loans, of course, are not the only thing that creates deposits. Deficit spending creates deposits with their being no private sector loan associated with that.

Non-bank elements of the private sector can also, of course, extend credit -- for example, by issuing bonds. Here, the borrower expands its balance sheet just like before, but the non-bank borrower does not, he just changes the composition of his assets.

Here are some related threads that happened to be going on elsewhere. First, from Mosler:

“He seems correct to me — can you take us through t-tables to show how deposits increase when private credit is extended in this way?how deposits increase when private credit is extended in this way?”

Deposits don’t need to increase as a result of this. That’s orthogonal, unless you are defining “credit” to be solely deposits, in which case you need another word for equity, bonds, money market mutual funds, and commercial paper. As well as repos and other credit-market instruments I must have missed. :P It’s good to stick to standard usage, as all of these are considered to be “credit market instruments”, and an increase in any of these corresponds to an increase in “credit”.

I think, if you want to only talk about deposits, then say “deposits”, or “bank credit”, if you prefer.

Just as with bank loans, the supply of credit market issues expands and contracts as return prospects change, and as a result, the quantity of deficit spending increases and decreases, causing the quantity of cash-flow surpluses to increase and decrease (which helps or hurts the thirsts of savers for more and more and more financial assets :P)

Any liquid IOU takes on the characteristics of money or “credit-money”, and the stock of these IOUs contribute to the stock of financial assets held by households. If the issuer of the credit market instrument is outside the household sector — say in the business sector, which would be typical for corporate bonds or equities, then an increase in these assets causes an increase in household net financial assets.

“So, the firm has a larger balance sheet, but the household has a balance sheet the same size.”

Yup. The borrower’s balance sheet is key. The borrower incurs a liability — to repay the loan, or to repay a bond — as well as an asset — a deposit, or money market fund, however he decides to park his short term assets while he goes about deficit spending.

But the point is that the borrower does not hang onto his asset. The loan is used to buy a house or car, and the bond is sold to expand industrial production. So the borrower then turns around and spends the asset (technically, he sells it for cash, pays the cash to someone else, and that person buys some financial asset with the cash — maybe a deposit, maybe a money market fund, maybe a bond — who knows?).

The bank borrower pays the homebuilder or the car maker, who in turn supplies wages and capital income to *someone* in the household sector, increasing that person’s financial assets. In the same way, the bond-seller turns around and invests in productive capacity by paying employees and parts suppliers, etc, and that ends up also increasing the wages and capital income of some households.

In both cases, investment is self-funding, and the “savings” of the fortunate workers or capital owners whose financial assets increased as a result of the deficit spending ends up being the accounting record of borrowing — whether that borrowing takes the form of selling bonds or borrowing from a bank.

As an aside, you can look at the various forms of credit market borrowing in table F.4 in Z.1. Hope that helps

Also, an oldy but goodie from JKH regarding equity (comment 188):

This is a response to Mahaish’s questions # 134 and # 151. It is a macro accounting explanation of the concept and measurement of household net worth, in the context of the Chartalist accounting model. It is not intended to address issues beyond that.

The top-down Chartalist sector balance sheet decomposition is that of government and non-government sectors. Although this breakdown could be applied globally, one typically would choose a particular national balance sheet to model, and then anchor the model with the corresponding government sector.

So let’s take the United States and the US government.

The entire United States balance sheet can then be modelled according to government and non government sectors.

The non government sector decomposes further into the private sector and the foreign sector. We can alternatively refer to the private sector as the domestic private sector, or the domestic non government sector.

The private sector decomposes further into the household sector and the non household sector. The non household sector is mostly incorporated and unincorporated business, including financial institutions.

The US household sector balance sheet as at June 30, 2009:

(Numbers rounded)

Total assets $ 67 trillion
Tangible assets 25 trillion
Financial assets 42 trillion

Liabilities 14 trillion
Mortgages 10.5 trillion
Consumer Credit/other 3.5 trillion

Net Worth $ 53 trillion

Household tangible assets of $ 25 trillion include about $ 20 trillion in real estate and $ 5 trillion in consumer durable goods.

Against financial assets of $ 42 trillion we net $ 14 trillion of liabilities (which are of course financial) to arrive at:

Household Net Financial Assets $ 28 trillion

This household net financial asset total is significantly larger than the total level of non government net financial assets for all sectors. The conceptual and numerical difference is explained below.

Any household financial asset that is not a direct obligation of the government must by definition be the obligation of another non government entity.

E.g. a corporate bond held by the household sector is the liability of the corporate sector.

Therefore, although the corporate bond contributes to both the gross and the net financial asset position of the household, it does not contribute to the net financial asset position of the entire non government sector, due to cancellation of the household asset against its corresponding representation as a non government liability.

This relationship holds for all financial claims of non government entities on other non government entities.

Importantly, this includes equity financial claims. This can seem a bit counterintuitive. Equity claims represented in the usual way on a balance sheet are not categorized as liabilities. However, the essential double entry book keeping characteristic is that they are on the right hand side of the balance sheet. The right hand equity entry directly offsets the corresponding asset entry on the balance sheet of the equity claim holder.

E.g. common stock held by the household sector is that sector’s financial asset. It is not technically a liability of the corporate sector. Nevertheless, it is a financial claim issued by the corporate sector in the sense that the owner of the stock has the right to benefit from all cash flows and valuation effects that accrue directly to the stock (dividends and marked to market stock price changes). This benefit reflects a comprehensive valuation of the operation of the issuer, including its deployment of real assets, its use of liabilities, and its ability to generate profits, etc. The point is that even though common stock is not categorized as a balance sheet liability, it is a financial claim issued by the corporate sector and a financial asset held in this case by the household sector. Common stock and equity claims in general are treated as a financial asset of the holder and a financial obligation of the issuer (cash flow and marked to market evaluated), and because of that essentially net to zero when consolidating the net financial asset position of the non government sector. The residual as a result of this equity netting includes the real assets of the issuer that are instrumental to the generation of such gross equity value. Depending on the objective of a given measurement exercise, those real assets obviously can also be valued separately from their representation as value embedded in the liability and equity structure of the issuer’s balance sheet. They are excluded from direct representation in the measure of net household worth because their implicit valuation has already been transmitted via the direct debt and equity valuation of the enterprise.

The household sector, in addition to holding direct financial claims in such forms as bonds and stocks, also holds financial assets in the form of mutual funds, pension funds, life insurance, and unincorporated business equity. Again, these positions are all represented as obligations of the issuer, and therefore all net out on consolidation with the household sector’s corresponding assets in the calculation of non government net financial assets. From the asset perspective alone, they constitute a large component in the gross financial asset position of the household sector.

One could similarly work through the balance sheets of the non household domestic private sector (incorporated and unincorporated business, including financial institutions) and the foreign sector. The business sector has a substantial net negative financial asset position, reflecting the corresponding net tangible or real asset position referred to above. The foreign sector has a positive net financial asset position, reflecting the result of a cumulative US current account deficit, with certain balance sheet items valued on a marked to market basis.

If one then nets the net financial asset positions of all these sectors against each other, the result will be an aggregate net financial asset position equal to the government net liability position, as per the Chartalist overview. Financial claims between non government entities net to zero. But government to non government financial claims don’t. The primary reason for this is that governments tend to issue more claims to non government than vice versa. The latter direction is quite possible of course. That is what has happened to a limited degree in the case of the US Federal Reserve accumulating private sector credit assets, and in the case of the US Treasury injecting TARP capital into the banking system. But such unusual US government financial asset activity has been mostly offset at the same time by the issuance of additional excess reserve base money by the Fed and additional bonds by the US Treasury. Beyond that is the aspect of outstanding and expanding US Treasury debt that reflects the more typical creation of net government liabilities due to government deficit spending. It is this latter net mismatch that results in the corresponding vertical net financial asset accumulation of the non government sector.

Two concluding points:

First, the net worth of US households was calculated at $ 53 trillion as at June 30, 2009. This includes “real” assets of $25 trillion and net financial assets of $ 28 trillion.

This net financial asset measure of $ 28 trillion is one of deceptively wide scope.

One may ask where the real assets of business can be found in this calculation. Where is the measure of plant and equipment investment value in the United States? Where is the left hand side of the business balance sheet?

The answer already alluded to above is that the real assets of businesses are reflected implicitly in the value of their financial obligations, which are included comprehensively in the value of household and foreign sector gross financial assets. This includes as well business liabilities and issued equity claims that are held indirectly through such household financial assets as mutual funds and pension. All business assets are reflected in this way. This is double entry book keeping hard at work.

Second, although this describes the connection between non government net financial assets and household net financial assets, one must delve deep into the various sector gross positions in order to extract the exact location of government issued liabilities held as assets by the non government sector. It’s there. You just have to look for where the government bonds are, as well as Federal Reserve currency, and finally central bank reserve balances.

(BTW, those who are interested in the consolidated treasury/central bank government position can find expert commentary from the various Chartalist oriented economist bloggers, including Scott Fullwiler, Randall Wray, Warren Mosler, and of course Bill Mitchell. But in summary, the net balance between government and non government includes the gross effect of central bank reserve balances issued to the banking system, central bank currency issued to the non government sector, and treasury debt issued to the non government sector.)

The bonds in particular are all over the place. For example, foreign central banks own trillions of US treasury bonds and bills, most prominently in China and Japan. Those central bank bond holdings are part of the gross US financial assets held by the foreign sector. In turn, the foreign sector in total has a net positive financial asset position with the US as counterparty (again the result of the cumulative US current account deficit).

The foreign sector thus includes a net asset position with the US government sector, embedded within its larger gross financial asset position with the US, and in conjunction with its total net financial asset position with the US. When one recognizes that the net horizontal asset position of the non government sector must sum to zero, one can then attempt to identity the location of the net vertical asset positions embedded in each defined horizontal sector. The foreign sector clearly has a net positive vertical position according to its bond holdings and some currency. The household sector actually has a modest vertical position relative to its size, consisting of bonds and currency. The rest of the vertical position exists in the non household private sector. Ironically, although this sector has a large net negative financial asset position, most of the net positive vertical position can be found in the gross assets of financial institutions and pension/life insurance investment funds. Against this would be netted the effect of Fed Reserve private sector credit and Treasury TARP funds. Thus, one may decompose sectors according to their positions in net financial assets, as well as their positions in net government assets. The sum in both cases will be the same, according to the overarching Chartalist axiom of aggregate net financial asset equivalence, with the government deficit equal to the non government surplus.

More on the yield curve, and Greece

Some further thoughts on recent posts (most of this is captured in the comments, but I thought I would bring it up as well).

1. Chartalists (or MMT) talk about "setting the yield curve to zero" by having the Government set a price (%) on bonds and issuing as many as is demanded, instead of what it does now which is sets a certain quantity, and then has the market clear to set the price.

In practice, because bonds get resold, and because they are not consumption goods (especially at short durations -- the value of a 3 month treasury note is not set by a downward sloping demand curve, it's set by its interest rate) the Government cannot actually increase or lower price by adjusting the quantity.

However, for longer durations, the willingness to pay for a bond depends on what the individuals inflation expectations are, and therefore I can see a distribution of expectations, and therefore a spread in willingness to pay. This would create a downward sloping demand curve and the Govt could set the price by adjusting quantity. Therefore, at longer durations I believe bonds would act as consumption goods in this sense.

Still, the most sensible approach would be to eliminate bond issuance entirely. It's a remnant of our gold standard days.

2. The Greek Central Bank can credit and debit accounts by simply marking them up or down -- just like the Federal Reserve, and unlike US States. Therefore, the eurozone is more like a cluster of multiple currency issuers who restrict money creation by... political rules (like the 3% limits). I'm actually not sure how fiscal discipline is imposed, formally or informally. If anyone has a succinct answer, please note it in the comments!

Two threads -- what I learned

I strongly recommend the thread on Unqualified Reservations (not the post). Some key things I learned:

1. Even people in banking do not seem to understand how banking works. The Academy, and therefore the Fed, are most clueless though.
2. Post-Keynesians tend to focus on how loans create reserves, that then get cycled into deposits via the overnight interbank lending market. In practice, banks run a day-to-day Treasury function that tries to fund assets with liabilities other than borrowed bank reserves overnight. The degree to which banks utilize the overnight interbank market varies by bank and bank business model, but generally, they try to get deposits and other liabilities instead.

This makes sense since bank profit is generated by the spread, and the lower your cost of capital, the higher your profit margins (as lending is capital constrained).